Web-based single sign-on describes a class of protocols where a user signs into a web site with the authentication provided as a service by a third party. In exchange for the increased complexity of the authentication procedure, SSO makes it convenient for users to authenticate themselves to many different web sites (relying parties), using just a single account at an identity provider such as Facebook or Google.
Introduction
The proliferation of web applications on the Internet has led to a sharp increase in the number of accounts (and corresponding credentials) that a web user has to create and remember. Inconveniences stemming from having to keep track of the accounts, and the tendency of web sites to suffer from security breaches, in which user credentials are exposed, has resulted in a recent push to adopt single sign-on (SSO) systems more widely 1 . As the name implies, these systems help reduce the large amount of account credentials a web user has to keep track of, by replacing these credentials with a single identity with which she can authenticate herself at many different web sites.
SSO systems allow users to sign into a web site (the Relying Party, or RP), such as StackOverflow, with authentication provided by a third party (the Identity Provider, or IdP), like Facebook or Google. While this greatly increases the convenience for both the users and the web site operators, it also brings new opportunities for attackers. A recent analysis of web-based SSO protocols by Wang et al. [33] identified five vulnerabilities in which a malicious attacker can impersonate a benign RP or intercept the communication between a benign RP and the IdP, leading to a compromise of the user's account's security. In fact, further research by Sun et al. [28] shows that 6.5% of RPs 2 are vulnerable to such impersonation attacks.
To understand SSO vulnerabilities better, formal security analysis has been carried out for existing SSO protocols. For example, AuthScan by Bai et al. [13] extracts the protocol specification from a SSO implementation and verifies the retrieved specification using formal analysis. On the other hand, ExplicatingSDK by Wang et al. [34] leverages formal analysis combined with a semantic model to identify hidden assumptions in the designs of the software development kits that are the foundation of many SSO implementations. Similarly, InteGuard by Xing et al. [35] correlates program invariants, to identify and mitigate logic flaws in SSO specifications, through a proxy situated between the user and the IdP. However, none of these prior approaches identified the actual root cause for vulnerabilities in SSO protocols that allow impersonation attacks, i.e., why these flaws exist in the current protocols in the first place. In this paper, we examined the design of existing SSO protocols and determined that the root cause of the aforementioned vulnerabilities lies in the broken design of the communication channel between the RP and the IdP. Depending on the protocol implementation, this channel either suffers from being a one-way communication protocol, or from a lack of authentication. This untrustworthy channel, in turn, makes existing protocols prone to impersonation attacks. Therefore, we propose to use a secure, authenticated, bi-directional channel between the RP and the IdP to prevent these attacks, by eliminating the root cause.
It is important to realize that the attacks discussed in this paper are not just theoretical. In fact, the vulnerabilities present in these protocols are currently
